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NATHAN BEDFORD FORR.FST: 
THE CONFEDERACY'S SELF-MADE CAVALRY HERO 
RFSEARCH METHODS IN HISrORY 
DR. BENJAMIN MCARTHUR 
8-DECEMBER-1994 
BRIAN ARNER 
Anxiously, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton opened William 
Tecumseh Sherman's letter. Somewhat troubled, he read of 
Sherman's intention to order two subordinates to tail Nathan 
Bedford Forrest. The urgency of the letter was obvious. These 
officers were to "follow Forrest to the death, if it cost 10,000 
lives and breaks the Treasury," since "there will never be peace 
in Tennessee till Forrest is dead. " 1 
So Sherman regarded Nathan Bedford Forrest, one of the most 
revered and colorful officers of the Civil War. He classified 
Forrest as a leader of "the most dangerous set of men that this 
war has turned loose upon the world," adding that "these men 
must all be killed or employed by us before we can hope for 
peace."2 Later, he described Forrest as "the most remarkable 
man the civil war produced on either side . . He had a 
genius for strategy which was original and to me 
incomprehensible. " 3 At one time, Sherman even offered to 
promote Brigadier General Joseph R. Mower "to the rank of major 
general" merely for obeying the command to "pursue and kill 
Forrest. " 4 
1 
1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C., 
.1890-91) [hereafter referred to as O.R.] , ser. 1, vol. 39, pt. 2, 
p. 121 . 
2William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman 
(New York: Library Classics of the United States, 1990), 363. 
3F. Norton Boothe, Great Generals of the Civil War and Their 
Battles (New York: Gallery, 1986), 133. 
4Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Wilmington, N.C .: 
Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1987), 263. 
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Yet Sherman was not alone in his respect for Forrest. Other 
leaders had similar praises for the cavalry leader. General 
Joseph E. Johnston unhesitantly identified Forrest as "the 
greatest soldier in the war."5 A friend of Ulysses Grant once 
related that Forrest "was the only Confederate cavalryman of whom 
Grant stood in much dread." If Grant learned Forrest was "on the 
prowl," "he at once became apprehensive, because the latter 
[Forrest] was amenable to no known rules of procedure, was a law 
unto himself for all military acts, and was constantly doing the 
unexpected at all times and places."6 
Forrest gained his reputation through extraordinary 
·accomplishments, some examples of which are impressive. During 
one expedition through northern Alabama and south central 
Tennessee (Sept . 21-0ct. 6, 1864), Forrest reported capturing "86 
commissioned officers, 1274 non-commissioned officers and 
privates, 67 government employees, [and] 933 negroes" while 
killing and wounding "about 1000 more," totaling "an average of 
one to each man I had in the engagements." Additionally, he 
captured "800 horses, seven pieces of artillery, 2000 strands of 
small arms, seven hundred saddles, fifty wagons and ambulances." 
He also destroyed one railroad while only having 47 of his men 
killed and 293 wounded during the raid. 7 
5Boothe, 1 33. 
6Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative (New York: Random, 
1963 ) 3 vols., 2: 65 . 
7Horn, 271. 
.. 
The following month Forrest conducted his similarly 
::~ 
successful Johnsonville expedition. He reported capturing and 
destroying "four gunboats, fourteen transports, twenty barges, 
3 
twenty- six pieces of artillery, and $6,700,000 worth of property" 
while capturing 150 prisoners, obtaining 9000 pairs of shoes, and 
seizing 1000 blankets. He suffered only 2 men killed and nine 
wounded. 8 
Forrest's bravery and tenacity matched his accomplishments. 
During the war, he was wounded 4 times and had 29 horses shot 
from under him. On one particular occasion, Forrest's horse was 
shot in the neck while he was chasing the Federals. Undaunted, 
Forrest remedied the problem by sticking his finger in the wound 
to stop the bleeding until he reached his destination. 9 Such 
·determination helps explain how he was able to kill 30 enemy 
soldiers during the war. 10 His willingness to personally lead 
out on the front line caused General Richard Taylor to "doubt if 
any commander since the days of the lion-hearted Richard killed 
as many enemies with his own hand as Forrest. " 11 
Despite the high praise he received, his incredible 
accomplishments, and his valiant courage, Forrest seems to have 
8Ibid, 277. 
9Foot e, 2:759. 
10Steven E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The 
Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Lawrence: University of 
.Kansas Press, 1990), 132. 
11 Cited in John Allan Wyeth, That Devil Forrest (New York: 
Harper, 1959) [hereafter referred to as Devil], 570. 
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been delegated to a minor role in the Confederate~strategy. At 
the height of his command, he l ead but ten thousand inexperienced 
troops, most of whom he himself recruited. He was isolated 
within Union territory where he waged guerilla- type warfare 
against superior forces while receiving little support from the 
Confederate government. Why was Forrest was not given a more 
significant role in the defense of the Confederacy? To fully 
answer this one must exami ne Forrest's background. His 
education, personality, and desire for independence all helped 
cast him into the part he played. 
I 
Unlike many of the Confederacy's generals, Bedford Forrest--
as he was called--came from a very modest background. He was 
raised in the backwoods of Bedford County, Tennessee. Bedford's 
father, William, was a respectable blacksmith and the Forrest 
family did reasonably well while Bedford was a child. In 1837, 
however, when Bedford was not yet sixteen, William Forrest died, 
leaving Bedford, his oldest son, to care for his mother and his 
eight younger siblings. 
Being the "man" of the family was a tough responsibility for 
young Forrest. He spent most of his time either out in the field 
working the family farm, tending to the livestock, or by the 
fireplace making clothes for his younger brothers. What little 
free time he did find he usually spent out in the woods hunting. 
When Forrest was twenty-one, he felt his younger brothers 
5 
were old enough to care for the household without him, so he 
ventured out on his own. He joined his uncle in an operation 
Bedford seemed naturally suited for: livestock trading. Blessed 
with an uncommon knack for business, Forrest prospered and soon 
expanded his operations to include real estate and slave trade. 
His success became apparent in 1845 when he married Mary Ann 
Montgomery, a member of a high-class family. 
In 1849 Forrest moved to Memphis, where he became very 
influential. Although he spent much of his time on business 
trips, he remained in Memphis enough to actively serve as an 
alderman. By this time he had grabbed a large share of the 
regional slave-trade market and was investing his profits in real 
estate. By 1860 he had amassed a fortune: he owned over 2300 
acres, owned 36 slaves, had a personal estate worth $90,000, and 
a yearly income of $30,000 from his cotton plantation. 12 
Although Forrest's wealth gained him membership into the 
upper class, his background made him an ill-equipped member. 
Forrest was undoubtedly hampered throughout his life by his lack 
of education. Uneducated past the third grade--though he did 
learn mathematical and speaking skills in his business dealings--
he often appeared rough-hewn and unsophisticated. 13 He spelled 
12Brian Steel Willis, A Battle from the Start (New York: 
Harper, 1992), 35; Jack Hurst, Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York: A. 
A. Knopf, 1993), 65. 
13Boothe, 123 . 
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atrociously throughout his life. 14 His strong accent also 
gained a reputation. His "idiosyncrasies" of speech "were 
·repeated and exaggerated" until many thought he was "more awkward 
and boorish in his speech as well as manner than he really 
was • nlS 
Forrest was quite aware of his shortcomings. Although he 
had gleaned "an excellent idea of the use of words and the 
construction of phrases" in his business dealings, he often felt 
uncultured. "No one knows the embarrassment I labor under when 
thrown in the company of educated persons," he once remarked. 16 
On another occasion he voiced his disdain for writing by 
muttering: "I never see a pen but what I think of a snake. " 17 
Forrest's uneasiness and educational defects would be noticed by 
his more-polished superiors during the war and adversely effected 
his advancement. 
II 
Forrest had no military training when he entered the war; he 
enlisted, in fact, as a private. Being wealthy, however, he was 
able to recruit and supply a whole unit and became commander of 
it. His subsequent promotions, though, were based on his 
14Maj or Anderson, one of his colleagues, noted that his 
spelling was"governed by sound, and his spelling, like his 
fighting, was the shortest way to the end" (Wyeth, Devil, 554). 
15Ibid., 555. 
16I bid, 554, 555. 
17Ibid. 
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battlefield performance . 
Forrest's capabilities were noted very early in the war. In 
a letter written to General Sidney Johnston in November, 1861, 
Samuel Tate describes Forrest's regiment as being as "fine a body 
of men as ever went to the field. Give Forrest a chance," 
he adds, "and he will distinguish himself. " 18 Two months later, 
General Charles Clark seconded that opinion, raving about 
Forrest's performance in "one of the most brilliant and 
successful cavalry engagements which the present war has 
witnessed. " He noted Forrest's "skill, courage, and energy" and 
took great "pleasure in calling to the attention of the general 
commanding and of the Government to his services. " 19 
Forrest's leadership in two significant engagements 
attracted attention. He gained fame at Fort Donelson by guiding 
a small group of Southerners on a bold escape from the Union 
siege just before the fort surrendered. At Shiloh, Forrest 
demonstrated his flexibility by leading a regiment of infantry 
when the use of the cavalry proved ineffecti ve . Such skills were 
not taught in military academies. 
In one respect Forrest's lack of traditional military 
training was actually an asset on the battlefield. His 
unorthodox tactics often gave him an advantage when facing a 
superior force. One favorite stratagem was to exaggerate the 
size of his force, implementing, as he called it, "the skeer." 
180 .R., ser, 1 , vol. 4, p. 513 . 
190.R., ser. 1, vol. 7, p. 64 . 
Once while pursuing General Jeremiah Sullivan, he had his men 
beat kettledrums "at widely scattered points" to create this 
illusion. Later, he had a group of captured Union soldiers 
overhear "bogus dispatches" before they were paroled "to spread 
bizarre reports of his strength. " 20 
8 
On another occasion, while communicating with a Union 
officer, Forrest tried a similar ploy. When the officer declared 
that he would not surrender until Forrest proved he had superior 
forces, Forrest had his men haul the same two guns over a visible 
stretch of road repeatedly. At last, feeling overwhelmed, the 
Union officer declared: "'Name of God! How many guns have you 
got? That's fifteen I've counted already ." Forrest coolly 
responded, saying, "I reckon that's all that has kept up." ~he 
officer subsequently surrendered. 21 
Forrest's creativity was revealed even when he was under 
pressure. In late 1862 he once found his regiment caught between 
Union forces on both sides. Pressed by his officers . for orders, 
he unexpectedly commanded them to "charge both ways. " 22 
These strategies did not come from any textbook, because 
Forrest had never studied any. Yet he possessed personal 
qualities which made up for this deficiency. As one British 
historian put it: "What he lacked in book-lore was to a large 
extent compensated for by the soundness of his judgement upon all 
2°Foote 2: 66, 67. 
21 Ibid. I 185. 
22Ibid. , 68. 
great occasions, and by his power of thinking and reasoning with 
great rapidity under fire. "23 
In at least one respect Forrest actually anticipated 
military thought. He was one of the first to identify the 
changing role of the cavalry. His men often "fought dragoon-
·style, riding to battle and dismounting to fight. This idea of 
[a] highly mobile striking power was to bear fruit from that 
point on in warfare. " 24 
Despite Forrest's unique style, his lack of training could 
be a liability, a drawback most noticeable early in the war when 
he lacked an accomplished reputation. His inexperience was 
especially noticeable in the eyes of General Bragg, who viewed 
9 
Forrest as "primarily a raider, not only a nonprofessional but an 
'irregular. '" 25 On another occasion, Bragg refused to send any 
supplies to Forrest's men, whom he considered "only partisan 
guerrillas. "26 In November 1862 , when Bragg was selecting a 
.chief of cavalry for the Army of Tennessee, he selected the West 
Point - trained Wheeler over Forrest. Bragg "considered the non-
professional Forrest a mere partisan, with few -capabilities for 
high command." Wheeler, on the other hand, "possessed a suavity, 
love of drill, and a vocabulary that outshone the rough-hewn 
23F. Norton Boothe, Great Generals of the Civil War and Their 
Battles (New York: Gallery, 1986 ) , 133. 
24Ibid., 122. 
25Ibid. I 2 : 81 3 . 
26Hurst, 1 08. 
10 
Forrest. "27 
Forrest would have experienced difficulties in his rise to 
the top even without Bragg's bias. He lacked two qualities that 
training may have given him, namely "discipline and 
organization" that would have allowed him to fit into the war 
effort more easily. 28 General Joseph E. Johnston speculated 
that had Forrest received proper training, he would have become 
"the great central figure of the war. "29 
III 
Forrest had a particularly difficult time disciplining his 
temper. He become easily enraged and displayed his wrath to both 
subordinates and superiors. On one occasion, a green soldier 
Forrest caught running away from the front line of a battle 
experienced this temper first-hand. A witness recalled Forrest 
grabbing the man and administering "one of the worst thrashing I 
have ever seen a human being get." Shoving the soldier back to 
·the front, Forrest yelled: "Now, God damn you, go back to the 
front and fight," adding that he "might as well be killed there 
as here, for if you ever run away again you'll not get off so 
27Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of 
Tennessee, 7861-7862 {Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1967), 27. 
28John Allan Wyeth, Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest 
(Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1975), 653. 
29Ibid., 653. 
_easy . nJo 
This type of reaction was not singular. A scout once 
brought a report that Forrest knew to be false. Forrest 
immediately leapt from his horse, grabbed the man, and 
administered a severe beating. After ramming the scout's head 
into a tree several times, Forrest released him, warning, "Now 
damn you, if you ever come to me again with a pack of lies you 
won't get off so. easy! " 31 
Forrest's officers were not immune to similar treatment. 
Forrest, a man who believed an officer should lead by example, 
11 
once became angered when he saw an officer idly watching his men 
struggling to get a caisson across a flooded creek. When Forrest 
asked the man why he wasn't helping out, he tersely replied that 
he was an officer. "I'll officer you!" Forrest angrily responded 
as he leveled the man with one blow of his fist. 32 
Another officer had a more fatal run-in with Forrest. 
Forrest, unhappy with the officer's performance, had asked that 
he be transferred . The disgruntled officer soon confronted 
Forrest and their conversation abruptly halted when the man shot 
Forrest in the hip. Enraged, Forrest grabbed the man and -stabbed 
him in the abdomen. Forrest then went to have his own wound 
3°Foote 2: 931. 
31 Wyeth, Forrest, p. 185; cited in Walter E. Pittman, 
"General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Military Leadership, " 
Tennessee Historical Society Papers 35 (1981), 59. 
Jr., 
West 
32Gen. James R. Chambers, "Forrest and His Campaigns," Southern 
Historical Society Papers 8 (1879 ) , 465; cited in Pittman, 59. 
12 
examined, and, when hearing the doctor's negative prognosis, 
became enraged and again chased after his advisory proclaiming 
that no one would kill him and live. Forrest's statement turned 
out to be half true when the officer died from his woun~ a few 
days later. 33 
Forrest often had problems in getting along with his 
superiors as well. These disagreements often arose over 
strategic decisions that Forrest disagreed with. His reactions 
periodically included outright insubordination. 
John Morton, Forrest's chief of artillery, relates one 
example of this. On one occasion General Hood ordered Forrest to 
send him some mules. Forrest refused, saying, "None of my mules 
will be sent in on that order." The next day, when another 
.officer came asking about the mules, Forrest went into a rage, 
declaring that: 
The order will not be obeyed; and, moreover, if Major 
Ewing bothers me any further about this matter, I'll 
come down to his office, tie his long legs into a 
double bowknot around his neck, and choke him to death 
with his own shins. It's a fools order anyway. 34 
General Wheeler was the target of another such incident. On 
several occasions Forrest had been unhappy with the commander's 
leadership. After one argument Forrest i mmediately alerted his 
officers of the dispute because he felt if he was killed during 
33Woodworth 224,225 . 
34Henry, Forrest, 273. 
.~p.e ensuing battle he did not want "to be held responsible for 
any disaster that may result."35 
13 
At last the tension reached the breaking point. Major 
Charles w. Anderson, one of Forrest's leading officers, reports 
that after the Confederate's .. disastrous" attack on Federal 
entrenchments at Dover, TN in 1863, Generals Wheeler and Wharton 
met with Forrest . After Forrest angrily remarked that he had "no 
fault to find with my men," Wheeler assured him that his report 
would do "ample justice .. to Forrest and his men. Unsatisfied, 
Forrest responded: 
General Wheeler , I advised you against this attack, and 
said all a subordinate officer should have said against 
it, and nothing you can now say or do will bring back 
my brave men laying dead or wounded and freezing around 
that fort tonight, I mean no disrespect to you; you 
know my feelings of personal friendship for you; you 
can have my sword if you demand it; but there is one 
thing I do want you to put in that report to General 
Bragg--tell him that I will be in my coffin before I 
again fight under your command. 36 
Forrest's disagreements with Wheeler were on a professional 
level; the two parted and remained friends until death. A more 
personal dispute once arose between Forrest and General Van Dorn. 
Van Dorn confronted Forrest because he didn't appreciate the way 
35Hurst, 11 3. 
36Wyeth, Devil, 131 , 132. 
he had been portrayed in report~ issued by Forrest's aides. 
Tempers increased until the two actually drew swords and were 
about to duel. Forrest, however, in a rare pacifying gesture, 
ended the confrontation by noting that a fight "would be a bad 
14 
example to the men, and there was, after all, the cause to think 
about. " 37 
A much more bitter dispute arose between Forrest and Bragg. 
As noted earlier, Bragg was slow in recognizing Forrest's 
leadership abilities. At one point he reportedly remarked to an 
officer that he didn't have "a single general officer fit for 
command--look at Forrest . . . . The man is ignorant, and does 
not know anything of cooperation. He is nothing more than a good 
raider. " 38 Conversely, Forrest often questioned Bragg's 
leadership. 
Hostilities between the two heightened in September, 1863, 
when Forrest was serving directly under Bragg in the Chattanooga 
area. At one point, Forrest got the upper hand in a fight with a 
Union force and was driving them from Chickamauga towards 
Chattanooga. Seeing his opportunity to sustain a major victory 
and capture the Union force, Forrest requested that additional 
troops immediately be sent to his aid. After receiving no reply 
for some time, Forrest personally went to see Bragg and found him 
37Robert Selph Henry, "First With the Most" Forrest, 1st ed. 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1944), 142-144; cited in Woodworth, 
224. 
38James Lee McDonough , Chattanooga--A Death Grip on the 
Confederacy (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984 ) , 32; 
cited in Willis, 143. 
1 5 
asleep. Bragg refused to send troops, claiming they lacked 
sufficient supplies. Forrest promptly responded by pointing out 
that supplies were available in Chattanooga, but to no avail. 39 
On his departure, Forrest exasperatedly asked bystanders, "What 
does he fight battles for?" 40 
The conflict between the two intensified when Bragg 
temporarily ordered Forrest's men to join those serving under 
General Wheeler. Forrest reacted by sending a "fiery" letter to 
Bragg, proclaiming "'Bragg never got such a letter as that before 
from a brigader. '"4 1 
The situation reached a climax the next day when Forrest 
personally visited Bragg. Ignoring all official formalities of 
respect, Forrest stormed into the general's tent and boldly 
confronted him saying: 
I have stood your meanness as long as I intend to. You 
have played the part of a damned scoundrel, and are a 
coward, and if you were any part of a man I would slap 
your jaws and force you to resent it. You may as well 
not issue any more orders to me, for I will not obey 
them . . . and I say to you that if you ever again try 
to interfere with me or cross my path it wil l be at the 
peril of your life. 42 
39Wyeth, Devil, 244 , 245. 
4°Foote, 2: 760. 
41 Ibid. , 8 12. 
42Ibid. , 8 1 3 . 
...  . , 
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His anger vented, Forrest left the tent as boldly as he had 
entered. The two did not put their differences behind them as 
Forrest and Wheeler had done. Friendly relations were never re-
established between them. As Forrest traveled to visit Jefferson 
Davis shortly after the incident, he told Colonel R. B. Kyle that 
"he would not serve longer under Bragg" because "he was not 
competent to command any army. " 43 
Dl 
Such blatant insubordination would have gotten a lesser 
officer court martialed. Forrest, however, was too valuable for 
the Confederacy to discard. Yet something had to be done with 
him, for he could not continue to serve under Bragg. Where would 
Forrest be placed? What kind of responsibilities would he be 
given? By this time, Southern leaders had had adequate time to 
evaluate Forrest's strengths. How would they use them? 
The answer came, in part, from Forrest himself. Forrest had 
earlier submitted a request to the Adjutant and Inspector 
General's office on Aug 9, 1863, asking to be transferred with 
400 men and artillery to Western Tennessee and Northern 
Mississippi. There, he intended to 110bstruct the navigation of 
the Mississippi River," and "procure a large force ... inside 
the enemy lines." He desired this transfer because of "repeated 
solicitations of numerous friends and acquaintances resident in 
West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi." He also desired the 
43Wyeth, Devil, 244,245. 
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move "to serve my coun.try to the best of my ability, and wherever 
those services can be rendered most available and m0st effective. 
If He added that his knowledge of the geography, the 
"prominent planters" of the region, the Mississippi River, and 
his men's familiarity of the region made this an ideal transfer 
for him. 44 
Yet the Confederate leadership did not readily agree, even 
after Forrest's confrontation with Bragg. Bragg, though quick to 
point out Forrest's shortcomings , realized his contribution to 
the fighting around Chattanooga. He was, consequently, hesitant 
to let Forrest go. Jefferson Davis , oversensitive to Bragg's 
wishes , delayed the request despite Forrest's personal appeal 
made during a meeting with Davi s. Davis did, however, reassure 
Forrest "of the full appreciation by the Southern people and by 
himself" for the "services he had rendered, and of his desire to 
conform to Forrest's wishes for an independent command in 
Mississippi and West Tennessee. 1145 Tennessee Governor Isham G. 
Harris also lobbied for Forrest's promotion, causing Davis to 
respond that Forrest's "services have heretofore attracted my 
favorable notice. 1146 
Early in October, Bragg, noti ng a change in "public 
interest , " removed his object i ons and asked "that the transfer be 
440.R., ser. 1, vol. 23, pt. 2, 955-956. 
45Wyeth, Devil, 24 5. 
46Dunbar Rowland, Ed., Jefferson Davis: Constitutionalist, His 
Letters, Papers and Speeches. 10 vols. (Jackson, Ms: Mississippi 
Department of Archives, 1923 ) , 6: 49-50. 
18 
made. 1147 Shortly, Forrest embarked for ~~stern Tennessee with 
310 men. His artillery, however, was "wholly inadequate" to 
obstruct navigation on the Mississippi. 48 This oversight was 
against the better judgement of James A. Seddan, Confederate 
Secretary of War. Upon viewing Forrest's initial request for 
transfer, Seddan noted that his proposal to halt Union traffic on 
the Mississippi River would strip 11the North of most of the 
fruits of their late success in Mississi ppi, and satisfy the 
Northwest of the impossibility of ever enjoying the Mississippi 
as an avenue of trade without peace and amity with the 
Confederate states." He added that the cavalry might effectively 
cut off trade on the Mississippi, the Union's only practical 
supply route to Mississippi and Loui siana. Davis, however, 
hesitated on the idea and "lost the untold benefits which might 
have accrued had this genius in war been turned, loose and 
untrammeled, to employ his never-ending resources in this 
important work. "49 
Although Forrest was restricted in his ability to strike 
Union shipping, he was to a large extent " t urned loose" in the 
West. Here he had more control over his own operations. This 
control was bolstered in early December, 1863, when Forrest was 
promoted to the rank of major general . Davis telegrammed General 
J . E. Johnston informing him that Forrest "was promoted to meet 
410.R., ser. 1 , vol. 31 , pt . 3, 604; cited in Hurst , 141 . 
48Ibid., 645; cited in Hurst 142. 
49Wyeth, Devil, 247. 
your wants, and the suggestion as to his position was made 
because of his local knowledge. "50 
19 
Forrest performed admirably on his home soil. Starting with 
a small contingent of men, his ranks swelled rapidly as he went 
through the countryside recruiting. He took responsibility for 
supplying his men, which he often did at his own expense. During 
one expedition, for example, Forrest spent $20,000 of his own 
money on supplies. 51 
General Viscount Wolsey, a chief officer in the British 
army, visited Forrest's command in 1864. His observations, later 
recorded in an article, are a tribute to Forrest's success in the 
West. He recalled watching Forrest's men file by one morning. 
They numbered about 10,000 men su£tably provided with blankets 
and equipment mostly stamped with "U.S." stamped on them because 
of their origin. They utilized 16 artillery pieces, 250 wagons, 
and 50 four-horse ambulances. Forrest "himself had enlisted, 
equipped, armed, fed, and supplied with ammunition all this 
force, without any help from his own government." During the 
last few years, he had "obtained nothing from the Quartermasters' 
or the Commissariat Department of the Confederate States." All 
weapons, "clothing, equipment, ammunition, and other supplies 
then with his command, he had taken from the Northern armies 
5~owland 6: 130. 
51 Wyeth, Devil, 563. 
20 
·opposed to him. "52 
Yet Forrest did more than just arm his men with Union 
supplies. His raids slowed Sherman's southeast push into 
Georgia. This strategy was part of a calculated plan approved by 
Jefferson Davis. In a telegram to General Richard Taylor, Davis 
argues Taylor would do "well" to employ Forrest "in operations on 
the enemy lines of communication , as well as to interfere with 
the transportation of supplies as reinforcement to General 
Sherman's Army. "53 Concerned about the security of his supply 
and communication lines, Sherman was forced to move cautiously 
southward. Forrest's affect on Sherman's advance was confirmed 
.by Georgia Governor Joseph Brown who argued in July, 1864, that 
Atlanta would be safe "if ten thousand good calvary under Forrest 
were thrown in his [Sherman's ] rear side of Chattanooga and his 
supplies cut off." Otherwise, he speculates, Atlanta could be 
lost, an eventuality 1tfatal to our cause."54 
Consequently, Sherman was forced to divert a substantial 
force to capturing or at least controlling Forrest. But the 
mobile Forrest was not easy to capture or control. His elusive 
force roamed largely at will through the region. They even made 
a bold raid into Memphis, a city tightly held by Union forces . 
Forrest's newfound content with his command by 1864 is 
52Robert Selph Henry, As They Saw Forrest; Some Recollections 
and Comments of Contemporaries (Jackson, TN: McCowat-Mercer Press, 
1956), 45. 
53Rowland, 6: 332-333. 
54 Ibid. I 6: 280. 
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reflected in his reports t~Confederate headquarters. Writing 
from Jackson, Tennessee, in April, 1864, he expressed confidence 
that he could "whip any cavalry they can send against me ." He 
declared his intent to remain in the area unless he was ordered 
elsewhere or "until driven out by the enemy." He did, however, 
"wish to have" his artillery and to "operate his rifle battery 
"effectively" on the rivers. He stated his belief that he could 
"hold West Tennessee against three times" his number whereby 
supplying the Confederacy with "all conscripts and deserters for 
service in the infantry from the region." He added that if 
enough money were sent he would be able to supply his command 
with all the small arms and ammunition required. 55 
Undoubtedly, one factor contributing to Forrest's 
satisfaction was the degree of independence he now enjoyed. 
While serving under Bragg, he had been restricted in his 
operations. At one point his men were even removed from his 
command and reassigned to Wheeler. Now, however, he served under 
Generals Stephen D. Lee and Dabney Maury who let him exercise 
control "as he saw fit. "56 Maury, upon assuming his command , 
made it a point to reassure Forrest that he was aware of 
Forrest's past success and did not intend to "interfere with your 
plan [s] for conducting these operations. "57 
This arrangement suit Forrest much better. His career 
550 .R., ser. 1 , vol . 32, part 1 , pp. 608-609. 
56Willis, 237. 
57 0. R., ser . 1, vol. 39, pt. 2 , p. 731; cited in Willis, 232. 
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¢iemonstrated that "when acting as part of a team, 11 he abandoned 
his intuition, and "reverted to the strict obedience of orde rs. " 
He 11 Simply worked better on his own, " flourishing when ' 'he could 
act in a relatively independent manner, exercising control over 
his affairs11 without " inter ference from his superiors. u sa 
John w. Morton, Forrest's commander of artillery, speculates 
that Forrest's personal history contributed to his desire for 
freedom. He notes · that his early hardships , such as having to 
assume responsibility for nine family members at age 16, for ced 
him 11 to think and act for himself, and thus, amid toil, 
privations, and hardships, he ·began development of that complete 
self-reliance which characterized his whole military career. "59 
The potential of Forrest's self-reliance was perhaps best 
seen in northeastern Mississippi at the Battle of Brice's 
Crossroads, arguably his best campaign. In a post-victory 
address made to his troops on June 28, 1 864, Forrest cl·aimed to 
have captured 17 guns , 250 wagons , 300 strands of arms , 2 , 000 
prisoners, and killed or wounded 2,000 more. This his 3,000 men 
achieved against 10,000 of "one of the best-appointed force s ever 
equipped by the Yankee nation. "60 
v 
Despite such success, however , it was soon apparent that 
~Ibid., 294-295. 
59Henry, A. T . S.F, 270- 27 1 . 
60 0 . R . , ser. 1, vol . 39, p . 228 . 
Forrest was fighting for a losing cause. Although Forrest's 
5,000 men valiantly 11tied down 11 over 200,000 Union troops, the 
·Union's grip on the South continued to tightened and conditions 
deteriorated. 61 Forrest had access to a diminishing base of 
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resources and became more isolated from the Confederate command. 
By March, 1865, Jefferson Davis wrote General Robert E. Lee 
admitting he did 11not know where and how Genl. Forrest is now 
employed. "62 
Forrest faithfully continued his efforts into April . Upon 
hearing of Lee's surrender in Virginia and Johnston's in North 
Carolina, he accepted the .inevitable and decided it was time to 
end the fighting. He bluntly told some of his troops that t hey 
might do as they please, but he was 11a-going home." When 
Governor Harris prompted him to continue fighting, Forrest flatly 
responded that "any man who is in favor of a further prosecution 
of this war is a fit subject for a lunatic asylum, and ought to 
be sent there immediately. " 63 
Forrest returned home after the war. In several ways he had 
given his all to the South. Besides risking his life 
continually, he had also lost his financial fortune supplying his 
own troops. Though he tried to regain his wealth in a railroad 
venture, he was never successful. His most notable post - war 
61Pittman, 53. 
62Rowland, 6: 520. 
63Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-
Reconstruction in the South~ 1865-1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1985) , 9; cited in Willis, 316. 
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."achievement" was his serving as the first Grand Wizard of the Ku 
~ .. 
Klux Klan. 
Ten years after the war, Forrest's health began to 
deteriorate rapidly. As he sensed the end was near, he aptly 
summarized the theme of his life to John T. Morgan, his legal 
advisor: 
My life has been a battle from the start. It was a 
fight to achieve a livelihood for those dependent upon 
me in my younger days, and independence for myself when 
I grew up to manhood, as well as in the terrible 
turmoil of the Civil War . 
Historian Brian Willis argues these words "suggested the grip 
that the desire for control had on him throughout his life. "64 
A large gathering assembled at Forrest's funeral in 1877. 
Among them was Jefferson Davis, who explained why he had not used 
Forrest more effectively: 
The .trouble was that the generals commanding in the 
Southwest never appreciated him until it was too late. 
Their judgement was that he was a bold and enterprising 
raider and rider~ I was mislead by them, and never 
knew how to measure him until I read the reports of his 
campaign across the Tennessee River in 1864. This 
induced a study of his earlier reports, and after that 
I was prepared t o adopt what you are pleased to name as 
the judgement of history. . . . I saw it all after it 
64Wyeth, Life, 622-623; cited in Willis , 377-378; Willis, 378. 
the judgement of history .. 
was too late. 65 
65Foote 3: 1 052-1 053. 
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I saw it all after it 
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Bibliographical Essay 
(Sources listed below not necessarily used in this paper ) 
Because of Forrest's colorful personality and outstanding 
military accomplishments, he has been the subject of many books. 
Three of the most authoritative books were written by men who 
fought with him after the war. The Campaigns of Lieutenant Gen . 
N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, General Thomas Jordan and 
J. P. Pryor (New Orleans and New York, 1868) was the first. 
Since this is the only book about Forrest which he personally 
helped write, it is considered to be the official autobiography. 
It is the most complete study of Forrest's military operations 
.during the war. After years of study and hundreds of personal 
interviews, John Wyeth completed the second: Life of General 
Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York, 1899) [reprinted as That Devil 
Forrest (New York , 1959)] is frequently r egarded as the standard 
biography. The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry, 
"The Wizard of the Saddle , John Watson Morton (Nashville , 1 909 ) , 
was the last major work written by one of Forrest's officers. 
Three additional notable books were published earlier this 
century: Bedford Forrest and His Critter Company, Andrew Nelson 
Lytle (New York, 1931); "First With the Most" Forrest, Robert 
Selph Henry (Indianapolis, 1944); and As Th~y Saw Forrest: Some 
Recollections and Comments of Contemporaries (Jackson, TN, 1956). 
The last of these provides many useful first-hand accounts of 
Forrest. 
-. Recently, two more biographies on Forrest have appeared. 
Battle From the Start, Brian Steel Willis (New York, 1992) 
provides a descriptive portrayal of Forrest and an outstanding 
bibliography. Nathan Bedford Forrest, Jack Hurst (New York, 
1993) is a very objective, well-researched work. 
My research on this project was conducted at the McKee 
Library (Southern College) and the John C. Hodges Library 
(University of Tennessee, Knoxville). Other than the Official 
Records, I was unable to locate any significant primary-source 
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material at either of these locations. For those able to engage 
in more ambitious research, collections of pertinent manuscripts 
are found in the following places: Chicago Historical Society, 
Chicago, IL; Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA; 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, N.C.~ William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, N. C.; Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, 
University Of Georgia, Athens, GA; and the Tennessee State 
Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. Probably the single best 
city to research Forrest in is Memphis, which has a large file on 
Forrest in its public library and a significant collection of 
manuscripts in the West Tennessee Historical Society located at 
the University of Memphis. 
